Decolonizing the Cosmopolitan Geospatial Imaginary of the Anthropocene: Beyond Collapsed and Exclusionary Politics of Climate Change

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Abstract: This paper extends Tariq Jazeel's argument on cosmopolitanism to the Anthropocene. Jazeel argues that cosmopolitanism should be thought of geospatially, as a geographic analysis reveals that cosmopolitanism cannot escape its own historically Western spatial imaginary, ultimately collapsing difference and universalizing humanity (77). In reaction against suggestions that cosmopolitanism is a more ethical and socially responsible approach to changing environments, I maintain instead that the Anthropocene already operates within a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, which not only collapses blame and responsibility in the face of global environmental crises but also silences and erases the historical contexts of exploitation and extraction that follow within north–south lines of coloniality. Therefore, a decolonization of the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene requires, in order to situate continued coloniality in environmental geopolitics and international relations, looking at the frameworks of both the nation–state and cosmopolitanism. The sections follow a critique of this proposed dialectic working within systems of exclusionary politics of the nation–state and the collapsing politics of cosmopolitanism.

Peter Marden has suggested that rising tensions between nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not as dialectically opposed as they might seemingly appear, but are both implicated within forces of globalization (37). I contend with Marden that these two conditions are actually much more intimately connected, but I also suggest that the rise of globalization as an “emergent” force, as Marden indicates, needs to be understood within imperial and colonial contexts – as globalization is connected to historical articulations of coloniality (Dalby 104; Doty 6; Epstein 3; Jabri 38). Perhaps it is no surprise that over the past two decades cosmopolitanism has been linked to another issue associated with globalization: climate change (Delanty and Mota 26–27). As Gerard Delanty and Aurea Mota state:
This cosmopolitan sensibility accords with the deliberative understanding of democracy. Moreover, it affirms the centrality of agency and an ethic of care and responsibility. For all these reasons, the political challenge of the Anthropocene is very much one that can be cast in the terms of cosmopolitics.

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However, it is the very humanity that cosmopolitanism produces that is the concern of this paper. I contend that both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are historically situated within a Western, imperial consciousness, including a Western, geopolitical imagination. This paper, therefore, investigates the ways in which these imaginations may limit our responses to changes within our environments.

Dipesh Chakrabarty states that two forces, perhaps more than any others, define our contemporary condition, both as individuals and collective citizens: “globalization and global warming” (1). Chakrabarty acknowledges that globalization has contributed to changes in our environments, as well as to the historical development of international relations of coloniality, which has also allowed forces of globalization to unfold in the ways that they have, including capitalist development and exploitation. I suggest that postcolonial theory is a productive perspective from which to analyze the intimate connections between globalization; the nation-state; cosmopolitanism; and the age now defined by the influence of humans on the planet, the Anthropocene.

On the Anthropocene, Chakrabarty also suggests that postcolonial thought may provide an appropriate and adequate understanding of the contradictory notion of the “human” to be utilized effectively in discussions of environmental changes. This stands in critique of the scientific literature that constitutes humans as “one” – that is, “a species, a collectivity whose commitment to fossil-fuel based, energy-consuming civilization is now a threat to civilization itself” (2). The collapse of differences in the scientific language of climate change,
particularly in the definitions associated with the Anthropocene, I argue, parallels Tariq Jazeel's critique of cosmopolitanism. Jazeel suggests that cosmopolitanism is no geographically innocent signifier, and to think of it geographically or geospatially indicates the ways in which any attempts to pluralize our understandings of cosmopolitanism ultimately serve to reinstantiate the liberalism, rationalities and taxonomies of thought that are tethered to the concept's irredeemably European and universalizing set of values and human normativities. In other words, cosmopolitanism's pluralization does little to open a Eurocentric critical intellectual imagination up to differences not proscribed by a centre that sets the parameters for difference. (77)

Therefore, following his suggestions, I look at the ways in which political imaginaries that respond to how we can live together may benefit greatly from “stepping out from cosmopolitanism’s long conceptual shadow” (77).

Associated with scientists such as Paul J. Crutzen, the Anthropocene is the newly suggested geological time period following the Holocene that is defined by the changes and influences of the human on the planet (Caluya 32; Chakrabarty 9; Luke, “On” 152). But as Chakrabarty also points out, the influence and significance that was once held only for geophysical forces is now given to humans; therefore, given Chakrabarty's and Jazeel's respective critiques on the collapse of a singular, collective human identity within climate change discourse and cosmopolitanism, it should be asked: who is the “we” in these collapsed imaginaries and how do we understand human agency, both as a collapsed signifier and as a geophysical force? In other words, this is a question of how we understand both the relations between “nature” and the “human,” and as Gilbert Caluya points out, “how we deal with nature is often a reflection of how we deal with humans and is thus reflective of human politics” (35).
As connections are made between globalization (in the intersections and histories of industrial, economic, and political developments) and climate change, the histories and continuities of coloniality and Western productions of knowledge, including the status of the nation-state, cosmopolitanism, international relations, and conceptions of the environment and nature, ought to be reconsidered within a project of decolonization. There are, of course, many potential and important interventions in which to take on a decolonization of international relations, but this paper is specifically concerned with conceptualizations of global climate change, including discursive productions of the Anthropocene, and how we conceptualize and imagine the human within it. In reaction against arguments that claim cosmopolitanism, or even cosmopolitics, as a more ethical and appropriate response to anthropogenic climate change (Alcaraz et. al 315; Haraway 12; Larsen & Johnson 5), I argue that the Anthropocene already follows a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, extending Jazeel’s argument to question how we might re-imagine the politics of togetherness and responsibilities. I suggest that this geospatial logic of collapse, uniformity, and universalization – an objective “view from nowhere” – is operationalized in the conceptualization of the Anthropocene as a Western logic system that collapses blame and erases the histories of imperialism and industrialization. These exploitative regimes have contributed to massive environmental change, and continue to do so, putting to trial and distributing the resultant impacts across a universal humanity.

Moreover, following the historical Western developments of both cosmopolitanism and the nation-state, decolonizing the Anthropocene would change how we respond to climate crises internationally and, subsequently, would require a decolonization of the nation-state itself. Therefore, in the following sections, I first consider the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state following Chantal Mouffe’s argument that Western liberal democracies are
historically developed within exclusionary politics and suggest that we can see how exclusionary politics are articulated and employed towards climate change after the 2016 U.S. election of Donald Trump as president (106). To be sure, the inclusion of this specific example of American politics does not indicate that national politics is now exclusionary, but that the nation–state itself is always already based on exclusionary politics, including in the mapping and historical spatial and strategic partitioning of the nation–state through systems of silences and utterances (Harley 57). Second, I consider the spatial imaginary of cosmopolitanism, which situates itself beyond the limited and exclusionary scope of the nation–state. Discussions of both spatial imaginaries are necessary for a decolonization of the Anthropocene and the nation–state because these are dialectical, not mutually exclusive, positions.

Both the Anthropocene and the nation–state highlight postcolonial critiques of capitalism, including the collapse and invasion of nature that is already operative in the global economy. Therefore, extending Jacques Derrida's suggestion that cosmopolitics is about hospitality and the stranger, “[w]hether it be the foreigner in general, the immigrant, the exiled, the deported, the stateless or the displaced person (the task being as much to distinguish prudently between these categories as is possible),” it follows that we also extend discussions of strangeness not only as potential sites of alternative knowledge production, but that we also consider the strange worlds that are produced within various conceptualizations of nature (4). This includes also making strange “the environment” as it is discussed now within a global political economy: cosmopolitics is also cosmo–economics. Moreover, as I will indicate, Derrida's discussion of cosmopolitics, as opposed to even Donna Haraway's use of it, is meant as a critique of the contradictory concept of cosmopolitanism, which ends up paralyzing political action (Critchely & Kearney x).
Seemingly, then, the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state produces exclusionary identity politics that limit the imagined response-ability towards strangers and strange worlds affected by anthropogenic climate change, while the geospatial imaginary of cosmopolitanism collapses the potential for differences in the ways in which we might conceptualize, respond to, know, and produce our worlds. Clearly neither collapsing nor exclusionary politics is effective or appropriate for dealing with the vast social, political, economic changes, disparities, and differences that continue to arise alongside changing environments, landscapes, and habitats. However, even as the paper is structured vis-à-vis the geographic imaginaries of the nation-state and cosmopolitanism regarding climate issues and the Anthropocene, and alongside them, notions of exclusionary and collapsing politics, I contend that these sections should be read as ongoing articulations and oscillations between collapse and exclusion, or even as silence and utterances. That is to say, first, the nation-state is only capable of producing exclusionary identity politics and spatial formations, as it already marks an idealized collapse of territory, polity, identity, and language. Such continuity in the production of the Western state is not natural but historically contingent within Western geographic and political thought; it has been criticized by Sankaran Krishna as producing “cartographic anxiety” within historically, non-Western, and radically plural cultures. Particularly following the era of sweeping postcolonial independence, there have been violent results within those territories taking up the project of Western state building and development (508; see also Ahmed 5). As part of this project, I suggest we can also look at how such cartographic anxiety is not only a part of “post” colonial societies but is integral within the project of Western nation building more generally, as seen in the following examples of America's recent anxious rhetoric of “America First” in responses to climate change. Second, in discussions of the Anthropocene and cosmopolitanism, I suggest that Jazeel’s use of Donna Haraway and the “view
from nowhere” – “the god trick, this eye fucks the world to make techno-monsters” – reveals the illusion of this collapsing of difference and blame. This particular geographic view simultaneously excludes potential alternative geospatial imaginaries, works in favour of a Western economic politicization of “the environment,” instead of multiple environments, and, ultimately, erases alternative ways of relating to the planet (581). In order to account for the continued imperial, masculine, and objective knowledge produced on the environment and nature, this paper also emphasizes indigenous and subaltern conceptualizations of environments, natures, and the interconnected systems of the human and non-human worlds.

The consideration of these oscillating systems should also include the global north's industrial history of exploiting resources from the global south (or Third World, colonial, and “developing” states), the former profiteering while continuing to effect vast changes upon environments. Indeed, the environment itself is now discussed as a geopolitical resource, which only contributes to the ongoing history of geopolitics and resource-grabbing instead of producing alternative formations and conceivable responses to such means (Vogler 6; Williams 53; Dalby 110; Mallinson and Ristić xiv). As such, decolonizing the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene inevitably requires alternative spatial imaginaries beyond global, international, or national concerns as we currently understand them. This acknowledgement is not a preferential argument for one over potential others, but rather, it is an attempt to recognize a series of planetary responses that are situated, partial, untranslatable, oscillating, radical, rhizomatic, etc.¹ Further, such differing perspectives can challenge science as a historical production of Western knowledge and values and its consequent relation to environmental politics (Caluya 31; Larsen & Johnson 192; Shiva 164; Vogler 13).
The Exclusionary Politics of the Nation-State

Although the spatial imaginary of the Anthropocene appears global, reactions and policies remain for the most part discussed in terms and relations to the nation-state. This section looks at how the discussion of the nation-state and the spatial imaginary of the state is reproduced within discussions of anthropogenic climate change, particularly in the context of the 2016 U.S. election. I use this as an example to highlight the continued colonial imaginary of geographic space within the nation-state in exclusionary politics, as well as to indicate that a cosmopolitan spatial imaginary does not work in contrast to a historically imperial spatial imagination and politics; rather, it is a continuous thread. This section considers the nationalistic discourses that produce the environment as a security threat and the ways in which this also parallels exclusionary identity politics and immigration relations.

Of course, I do not mean to presume by my engagement with the nation-state in environmental politics that it is the only agent involved. As John Vogler notes, other agents and factors include individuals, transnational actors and governments, inter-state politics, international institutions, or even a more general conceptualization of a global system (15). To focus on the nation-state, however, is to acknowledge that its privileged position in environmental politics is “invariably conditioned by a given ideologically structured conception of the environment” (Williams 43-44). This must also involve an interrogation of the presumptions of the state, including its objective and ahistorical discourses.

The recent 2016 U.S. presidential election indicated ongoing discursive power formations, such as the denial of global climate change. Many feared that, moving into 2017, president-elect Donald J. Trump would roll back or alter many of the policies and regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Malakof et. al 1364). Trump indicated that he would put leaders of the fossil fuel industries into key positions, and possibly leave international agreements. Of
course there was also Trump's now-infamous tweet – not to mention numerous related tweets between 2013 and 2014 – that “[t]he concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” In yet another earlier tweet, Trump claims that “[t]he con artists changed the name from GLOBAL WARMING to CLIMATE CHANGE when GLOBAL WARMING was no longer working and credibility was lost!” Additionally, among these concerns were possible changes that the administration might make towards an economic measure known as the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), which attempts to quantify the economic price of carbon emissions, in future-oriented terms (Malakof et. al 1365). The goal is to provide a discount rate indicating how much could be spent now to avoid higher costs in the future, and the accruing damage that goes along with these discounts. Attached to the SCC, and most importantly for my concerns here, is a geographic component. During Barack Obama’s administration, the SCC had worked out to a rate between 2.5 per cent to 5 per cent, leaning towards the lower end of the range, and these numbers were based off global considerations as well as what would benefit the U.S. (Malakof et. al 1365). That is to say, the scientific knowledge productions that surround the state policies of Obama’s administration considered simultaneously that which is in excess of the territory and policies of the nation-state. The concern with Trump’s administration was that the SCC would start operating on a higher rate, which would require less capital and regulations at first, but potentially incur a much higher cost later.

However, it is not only in the regulations around the SCC that we see instances of discursive formations emerging between nationalism and potential cosmopolitanisms; a similar geospatial dialectic was at work when President Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. The President announced on 1 June 2017:
[I]n order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its citizens, the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. [...] As President, I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American citizens. The Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries. ("Statement"; emphasis mine)

Obviously, the rhetoric here is nationalistic and articulates an exclusionary us-versus-them dynamic, where the American citizen must be protected from the bad deal of taking on the responsibility of the rest of the world. This follows precisely along the lines of Chantal Mouffe's observations of the exclusionary politics necessary for Western liberalism: “In the West the meaning of democracy was founded on the differences established between its own system of governance and those of the ‘other’ that rejected it” (105). Mouffe proceeds to argue that “[t]he political cannot be grasped by liberal rationalism as it shows the limits of any rational consensus, and reveals that any consensus is based on acts of exclusion” (106). The point is that, although Trump's policies clearly indicate extreme exclusionary and nationalistic politics, they are consistent with the politico-territorial production of the nation-state within Western liberalism. This coincidence does not get him off the hook, so to speak; rather, it indicates that more work must be done to reconceptualize potential responses and response-abilities to changing environments, landscapes, and natures (Haraway, Staying 16). For example, even in arguably better regulations, as indicated by the SCC numbers, scientific knowledge production around and about the climate goes unquestioned in its objectivity, and it’s also both limited and wielded by the nation-state in the stance of an external threat. The exclusionary politics of Trump’s speech on the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Climate Accord simultaneously produces economics, the environment, and the political Other as an external threat. To address these hostilities, I suggest that we look at all three
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The effects of environmental changes could arguably be traced back to the production of new technologies (e.g. the Industrial Revolution and our current production emissions) and the historico-economic relations that are intimately connected with them. For example, the Industrial Revolution is often equated as sign of progress and human ingenuity, but this appraisal downplays the extractive and imperial policies necessary for such “progress” to be made (Caluya 35). The deep connections between capital, material productions – in terms of both commodities and waste – and the environment are played out often in Trump's speech, but here it is the priority of protecting the rights of American industries, such as coal, to thrive and to not be reined in by the impending rhetoric of climate change by the rest of the world. Once again, the President stresses, “The Paris Agreement handicaps the United States economy in order to win praise from the very foreign capitals and global activists that have long sought to gain wealth at our country's expense. They don’t put America first. I do, and I always will ... I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris” (“Statement”). By emphasizing Pittsburgh over Paris, Trump directly reacts against a geospatial imaginary that is external to the state. However, this reactionary spatial imaginary does not seek to efface blame through acts of exclusion. Rather, it denies blame altogether. Further, it is also becoming increasingly difficult to roll back the spatial imaginary of either climate change or the global capitalist economy.

Of the current U.S. environmental policies, John Bellamy Foster asks if this “monopoly-finance capitalism – with Donald Trump as its authentic representative – [is] contributing to this impending planetary catastrophe?” (1-2). And in raising this concern, Foster connects the spatial reach of the global capitalist system emerging as climate change itself: “The capital-accumulation system, however,
has now expanded its operations to encompass the entire planet, disrupting the biogeochemical processes of the Earth system itself, most dramatically in the form of climate change” (4).

To speak of contemporary spatial imaginaries is to also acknowledge the extension of capitalism into space, not only within pre-existing space, but also the spaces that are produced by capitalism. This observation by Henri Lefebvre follows his assertion that “new contradictions generated by the extension of capitalism to space have given rise to quickly popularized representations” (326). The ability to calculate the cost of climate change, not just as a metaphoric implication, but also as an actual quantity and the ongoing production of nature within capitalist representations, indicates moments when the Anthropocene also becomes the “Capitalocene” (Delanty & Mota 23; Haraway 47). Although Delanty and Mota, who reference the term, make a point to distinguish that not all of human activity can be explained by capitalism, I would suggest that it is important to consider how often such quantifications of capitalism arise within our current production of the Anthropocene (23). Conceptualizing the Capitalocene requires simultaneous historical representations and reproductions of capital, the environment, and space, as well as an examination of how these relations have become hyper-politicized along postcolonial lines or in north-south global relations. Further, Delanty and Mota note the different time periods that have been marked as the originating point of the Anthropocene, such as Masline and Lewis’s “Orbis thesis,” which names the year 1610 as the starting point, and the changes in population, species, foodstuffs, and deforestation during Western Imperialism in the Americas (14). Gilbert Caluya also notes the Industrial Revolution as another origin marker of the Anthropocene. However, I suggest that it would be more accurately labelled as the “Eurocene or Anglocene” (35). While I'm less interested in when the Anthropocene began, I find these examples helpful as they highlight the continued historical implications of
Western imperialism and its notions of progress, and they are also directly tied to their consequent historic economic and environmental exploitation.

The triad of the environment, capitalism, and national identity is of high importance in discussions concerning many small island nations where rising sea levels are threatening their futures. Our inability to discuss environmental politics outside of the nation–state extends to our inadequacies of relating to individuals who will find themselves between states because of changing environments, landscapes, and waterscapes. The plight of these individuals indicates the need for alternative geographies – that is to say, alternative identifying spaces – leading Carol Farbotko, Elaine Stratford, and Heather Lazrus to conceptualize “geographic identity as performative,” particularly in the anticipation of a climate crisis, and to reflect “on whether there is a collective embrace or rejection of the idea of mobility in performances of identity among island peoples facing various scenarios of migration” (547). It's not only the formation and organization of the world into nation–states that produce the stateless, as Chakrabarty observes, but the forces of globalization and changes in environments and climates also produce such a possibility (7). If we consider briefly that the promise of cosmopolitanism is to move beyond the formation of the nation–state, then we might posit that there is no cosmopolitan home for the truly cosmopolitan, as the climate change migrant and other refugees are not seen as beyond the nation–state but liminal, and even precarious. Thus the Western historical imaginary of cosmopolitanism begins to reveal itself. Geopolitical formations of the nation–state and the cosmopolitan spatial imaginary of the Anthropocene oscillate back and forth in responses and reactions to imagined internal and external threats. Amidst questions of blame, exclusionary politics, and forced migration, as well as many other concerns, the moral dilemma of changing geographies and spatial imaginaries also becomes apparent.
As issues of migration and displacement by changing climates continue to challenge cosmopolitanism and the questions of a nation's hospitality, an inimical cosmos-politics will only continue to develop, as has been seen in the response to Syrian refugees, the nationalistic concerns leading up to the Brexit vote, and the populist bellowing of Trump's American-Mexican border wall during the 2016 U.S. election (Haidt 46; Wodak & Krzyżanowski). Foster also makes the argument that “Trump's promise to ‘build a wall, along the border with Mexico to block ‘illegal immigration’ can be read at least in part as a reaction to climate change, even as the latter is being denied—just as sea walls are hypocritically being proposed by climate deniers in parts of the South as a means to protect coastal real estate” (11). Mouffe makes the point that, in the exclusionary politics of Western liberalism where there is an absence of an obvious external threat from which to base national identity, the focus turns to increased nationalist and populist politics in the face of the internal enemy, as represented by the immigrant (105). The immigrant, the foreigner, the stranger threatens national identity and sovereignty. But as these exclusionary politics parallel and interweave with understandings of environmental politics, the threat is simultaneously internal and external to the state. Derrida’s critique of cosmopolitanism is that it invokes a universal hospitality without limits, but the law of hospitality – in its notion of going beyond – can only be invoked by a simultaneous declaration of or by the state, limited by legislation. Therefore, cosmopolitanism’s hospitality, which already oscillates between host and hostility, is always in danger of being “perverted at any moment” (Derrida 23).

In addition to the environment being perceived as an internal and external threat to national security, it also becomes a concern of geopolitics (see Williams 44). This allows for Dalby to discuss the global war on terror along similar lines as the Anthropocene, because the political and economic importance placed on oil has led to the inscription of environmental discourse within imperial and
colonial modes of thought, rendering the environment as both a resource and an external threat (111, 113; see also Caluya 36). Further, the conceptualization of the environment as both an extractable and commodifiable resource, as well as a potential threat to national security, only indicates a continuing imperial geographic logic that ensures the primacy of the nation-state within the discussion of environmental politics. Additionally, the environment that the state protects is also a historically specific imagined environment. For example, Caluya observes that settler colonial states are rarely concerned with readapting the environment to where it was before colonization; instead, they are only interested in maintaining the status quo after colonial violence, including the presence of non-native agricultural species. Caluya writes that this indicates that “invasive biology rhetoric often takes for granted the ‘naturalness’ of human colonization, even as it claims to be concerned about the ‘unnaturalness’ of non-human colonization” (36). The exclusionary mechanisms of the nation-state also collapse or erase the historical contingencies of many settler colonial states, particularly the fact that the human in these instances is the invasive species. Moreover, the rhetoric of invasion not only applies to discussions of the environment and the species that inhabit within it, but it is also employed often within racially charged discourses around immigration. Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that the focus in the U.S. during the 2016 presidential election was the nation as a site of exclusionary politics in terms of more than just the environment. It is the geospatial imaginary of the nation-state as the site of potential resistance against a cosmopolitan imaginary that allows for such politics to emerge within contemporary discourses.

In discussions of the environment as a threat to the state, both the geospatial imaginaries of the nation-state and the Anthropocene emerge, at once reinforcing the boundaries of the state and that which is beyond it. Both of these discourses are not produced separately but simultaneously within the globalized
threat of environmental crises. Here, environmental crises are synonymous with state crises. Perhaps it should be argued, then, that a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary is necessary in order to move beyond exclusionary and even imperial geospatial imaginary of the nation-state, because it's a geographical production of scale and social coexistence that can adequately tackle the scale of environmental crises and their attendant threat to humanity.

In the following section, I will argue, first, that the Anthropocene already works within a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, and any suggestion for cosmopolitanism as an ethical reaction to the Anthropocene already fails within its own logic system. Seen in this context, they are tautological. Second, because the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene is not in opposition to the nation-state, but follows similar Western imperial and colonial geopolitical and temporal understandings, what is ultimately needed is a decolonization of the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene.

The Collapsing Politics of a Cosmopolitan Anthropocene

Jose M. Alcaraz, Katherine Sugars, Katerina Nicolopoulou, and Francisco Tirado have recently suggested that as “[i]nitially developed in the natural sciences (Earth-systems sciences, resilience theory, social-ecological systems), the Anthropocene offers powerful new insights to think about the–planet–as–the–“cosmos”–of–cosmopolitanism” (315). They also contend that taking a cosmopolitan perspective towards the Anthropocene may elicit a more ethnically and socially responsible approach towards global climate change when we consider the “distant other.” Towards these ends, they align their work with Tariq Jazeel’s 2011 article, “Spatializing difference beyond cosmopolitanism,” on which they draw to contend that cosmopolitanism should be considered geographically (Alcaraz et. al 315). But what gets left out of such a framing is that, while Jazeel does argue that cosmopolitanism should be thought of in geographic terms, he is primarily concerned with what a geospatial perspective
of cosmopolitanism enables us to do. For Jazeel, this is to demystify “the view from nowhere” from which cosmopolitanism views the world, and “thinking spatially about cosmopolitanism is precisely what offers the capacity to prize apart some of the concept's unthinking Eurocentrism” (77). That is, while aligning their argument for a cosmopolitan response to the Anthropocene with Jazeel, Alcaraz and others actually miss his main argument, which is that thinking of cosmopolitanism geographically allows it to be critiqued as a universalizing Western imaginary that collapses difference. This concern of cosmopolitanism does not neatly resolve itself when placed within the context of the Anthropocene, but hides the ways which humanity continues to be universalized and collapsed within the use of environmental politics. Such a perspective also fails to see the ways in which the Anthropocene is already cosmopolitan, what Gerard Delanty and Aurea Mota have referenced as the “Cosmopolocene” (11). The Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Cosmopolocene emerge simultaneously within a historical, Western geospatial imaginary. Elizabeth Johnson and Harlan Morehouse contend that a geographic consideration of the Anthropocene allows us to

explore the relationship between biopolitics and the emerging ‘geopolitics' of our new epoch; the patterns of inequality and difference emergent as part of the Anthropocene’s universalizing ‘anthro'; the limits of political subjectivity, agency, and technological managerialism; and innovative methods for socio-ecological practice. (440–441)

By stressing the geographic, any notion of a Cosmopolocene must be done by also acknowledging the performativity of historical power relations, even in this future-oriented condition. The Anthropocene is produced within a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary as they both follow what Denis Cosgrove refers to as the Apollonian gaze, a “gaze, which pulls diverse life on earth into a vision of unity, is individualized, a divine and mastering view from a single perspective” (xi; qtd.
in Jazeel 80). This view from nowhere served historically through imperial and colonial cartographic practices, and continues in our current view of “globalization.” It is not a politically neutral concept (Delanty & Mota 24).

Timothy Luke has written that “[r]apid global climate change is a set of real geophysical and biochemical realities. Yet, it also is now a rich political imaginary pulling together complex clusters of signs, symbols, and stories” (“The Climate” 280). The Anthropocene is one of many possible stories and geographies with which we might imagine a response-ability to one another but also one that should be historically contextualized within its cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary, producing a collapsed and collective “all of us” in a singular, political space referred to as “the environment.” But the Anthropocene is also a potentially problematic “tool, story, or epoch to think with,” particularly when the objectivity within its scientific knowledge production is left unquestioned (Haraway, Staying 49). To place and collapse all of humanity as a universal subject within geographic imaginary of the Anthropocene is a colonizing move in itself.

Both cosmopolitanism and the Anthropocene work only by a willing transcendence to a global, geotechnical planet. For example, Luke observes that, in part, studies on the Anthropocene are produced as “various networks of scientific and technical experts once again position themselves to administer from above and afar any collective efforts to mitigate or adapt to rapid anthropogenic climate change” (“On” 141; emphasis mine). This political distancing by scientific and technical experts not only signals the space necessary to produce objective knowledge but also parallels Jazeel's critique of the geospatial imaginary of cosmopolitanism. It is exactly this geotechnical eye that collapses and transcends what Haraway has referred to as a “god trick,” that is, “[v]ision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put myth into ordinary practice. And like the god trick, this eye fucks the
world to make techno-monsters” (“Situated” 581). The view “is the achievement of an imperial effort to design universality; an effort whose idiom is entirely continuous through the fashioning of a self-confident European, and Enlightenment, ‘planetary consciousness’” (Jazeel 82). A techno-planetary view allows us to see that a solution is possible, that all we need is a scientific achievement. Through continued echoes of Western Enlightenment the planet is placed on a teleological, technical horizon, “an omnipolis ready to be geoengineered” (Luke, “On” 162). Instead, as Haraway suggests, response-ability may also require, at times, acknowledging that we might not all make it; instead, the goal “is to make kin in lines of inventive connection as a practice of learning to live and die well with each other in a thick present. Our task is to make trouble, to stir up potent responses to devastating events, as well as to settle troubled waters and rebuild quiet places” (Staying 1).

Climate change has always been about inequalities (Roberts & Parks 194). These inequalities, as can be expected, not only follow the imagined and produced geographic formations of the global north and south but also furthers their divisions. That is,

[these compounding inequalities overlay an already polarized North–South debate and enmesh rich and poor countries in an adversarial negotiating environment. As such, it has become exceedingly difficult to broker a mutually acceptable international agreement that would stabilize the climate. (Roberts and Parks 194)]

Not only does the discussion of climate change in terms of the Anthropocene collapse these differences, blame, and inequalities, it also masks the problem of economic production, focusing instead on the issues of geological formations.

This “unreal universality of the Anthropocene hides the profane practices of degraded capitalist individuality in the detritus left by the machinic means of personal lives defined by the alien powers of commodification. These new
Anthropocenic chronicles also estrange Man from nature, himself, and species-being" (Luke, “On” 146). The view from nowhere is all too objective and at the same time is all too human. It is made subjectively-objective by the position of looking at the earth from above; the imagined human eye on the world, and what that eye sees, is not its own humanity but its own collapsed erasure. It is precisely the collapse of the human that allows it to re-emerge as a universal oneness, a whole unified humanity. But as Luke indicates, this subject as humanity is not all “men” but, rather, a select few. A cosmopolitan imaginary allows us to imagine all humanity, but only as it is “ours” – that is to say, a historically Western narrative of humanity.

Marc Williams notes that environmental concerns were not of great importance to international relations scholars before the 1980s (42). Indeed, as “[a]ccelerated environmental degradation raises crucial questions concerning humanity’s relationship with the natural world, and with other species,” international relations theory attempted to view environmental concerns as a global problem (42). However, such a move only continued to reproduce the silences and erasures in the mapping of global environmental crises within the objective, scientific production of Western knowledge, since it also simultaneously “removed from critical view the ways in which, historically, environmental issues had been silenced” (Williams 43). The decolonization of the Anthropocene and international relations also gestures towards a decolonization of the field from which these imperial and colonial articulations of power is studied.

As noted earlier in the paper, Chakrabarty points out a contradictory understanding of the human within the Anthropocene. First, the human is held responsible, as both purposeful and agentic, for the changes in their environments. Second, likened to a geophysical force, humans are, in turn, likened to the nonhuman and, by extension, invested with nonhuman agency. He
suggests that in discussion of the anthropogenic climate change and global warming, one has to think of these things simultaneously: “the human–human and the nonhuman–human” (11). As a collective agency, it is neither subject nor object but “pure, nonontological agency” (13). Paralleling once more Jazeel’s arguments, there is no corresponding human agency, as humanity gets universalized, with differences re-routed or collapsed, and becomes apolitical in the cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary of the Anthropocene. This “collective mode of existence,” as a universal humanity affecting change and as a geophysical force, is also “justice-blind” (Chakrabarty 14). Inequalities persist, but they also may be required.

Chakrabarty suggests that simultaneous contradictory registers are needed in order to address this human and non-human relation and that we need a way of conceptualizing the human beyond where postcolonial thought has advanced it, “as a geophysical force and as a political bearer of rights and as author of actions; subject to both forces of nature (being itself one such force collectively) the contingency of individual human experience; belonging to differently-scaled histories of the planet, of life and human societies” (14). But if any mode of conceptual and theoretical thought has taught us about finding value and lenses in the contradictory and liminal spaces of identity, it is the postcolonial, but now decolonization may be required. A decolonization of the Anthropocene is not just an ethical stance to account for the silences and erasures of our current climate politics, particularly seen in discourses specific to the nation–state, but it is also ethical in terms of the potential survival of the human and nonhuman–human, even as these relations oscillate between wild excesses and differences beyond the scope of precise definitions and diagnosis.

Engaging with the non-human, for many people around the world, also involves moving beyond just dualistic notions of nature and extends, for example, to the notions of spirits and the sacred. Mabel Denzin Gergan points out that,
although the agency in gods, spirits, and deities is less explored when it comes to environmental concerns, such entities might open up discussions of indigenous knowledge about local geographies and could be helpful to our current understandings of nature, in that such knowledge works toward the decolonization of the Anthropocene through acknowledgement of the excess, and radical plurality, of lifeworlds and environments. Indeed, religious and spiritual beliefs can offer alternative ways to understand and cope with environmental changes and crises, as well as establish different relationships to non-human agency (Gergan 263). Furthermore, pending Chakrabarty’s suggestion that a postcolonial approach provides a way to handle and hold up simultaneous diffractions and contractions of the human and non-human within a potential ecological crisis, engaging notions of the sacred or divine within nature continues to blur the lines between the human and non-human, culture and nature.

Dalby poses a question similar to what I am asking here: “[h]ow then might we think differently about the global ordering of politics in the Anthropocene?” (113). What he suggests is echoed by many indigenous scholars, which is to reconceptualize place, geographies, and ourselves; environments and places can no longer be seen as external from the human but are both a part of the human experience and also more-than-human (Dalby 116; Larsen & Johnson). Soren C. Larsen and Jay T. Johnson make the explicit argument for place in the discussion of environmental concerns, particularly in localities where we can learn from native and indigenous peoples. Place is multiple, plural, and rhizomatic; “Place is not just a sited forced engagement, but is actively initiating and sustaining coexistence struggle in lands that have been exploited and degraded but that are still claimed by the Indigenous peoples who assert their belonging, guardianship, and sovereignty” (Larsen & Johnson 1–2). Although here it is important to determine exactly who and what is meant by sovereign. In order to address the
many different scales in all of their messy entanglements, Larsen and Johnson examine the positionalities and cosmopolitics of co-existence:

Cosmos here refers not to an ordered whole but to the agonism of worlds in place. Comprehension of the whole is precluded not only because our own worldviews are partial and situated, but because the whole does not exist as a static object that can be comprehended as such – our co-becoming is embodied, fluid, and dynamic, a worlding. (5)

Haraway also holds out for a response-able cosmopolitanism, and suggests that, perhaps, “[t]elling stories together with historically situated critters is fraught with the risks and joys of composing a more livable cosmopolitics” (Staying 15).

However, referencing Jazeel's argument, the “cosmos” of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitics cannot escape its own Western conceptual shadow no matter how many times it's deconstructed or pluralized. Moreover, we might ask, why do we need cosmopolitanism here? Is there not a way to imagine one another in differing places and scales without continually being tied to cosmopolitanism? Yet, if I follow Jazeel's lead, it is possible to move out of this conceptual shadow by thinking of cosmopolitanism, again, on geographic terms. As much as cosmopolitanism holds promises of plurality it is still a holistic geographical conception, which can be used too easily as a universalizing tool. Additionally, engaging cosmopolitanism within plural understandings does not erase the historical geospatial baggage or its contemporary manifestation in the declaration of the Anthropocene. Since the Anthropocene is derived from Enlightenment logic, and threatens to co-opt that version of humanity, postcolonial and indigenous concerns must be taken seriously in criticism of the Anthropocene, as it “does not sit comfortably within Indigenous ways of thinking, in large part because it derives from a Western time-based ontology that is at odds with the place-based ontologies of Indigenous peoples” (Larsen & Johnson 31, 192).
Larsen and Johnson note that the Anthropocene is proof of humanity's quest to master the Earth, but I argue that it is the production of the Anthropocene itself, a conceptualization of a universal humanity as a geophysical force through an objective and scientific lens that views the world in transcendental heights that also proves humanity's quest to master blame (197). This is a critique beyond just the effects of the Anthropocene, but a critique of it as the tool to measure the effects of changing climates. The Anthropocene as a concept follows the continued supremacy of sky gods, whether we shall name them Apollo, Progress, or Modernity (Haraway *Staying* 57). Additionally, the scale of the Anthropocene erases the many apocalyptic experiences that indigenous, native, colonial, and “developing” populations have already experienced under imperialism and colonialism. These are more than historical encounters; they stem from the devastating impacts of contemporary government policies and actions that have destroyed homes, cultures, landscapes, and ways of living. The nation-state once again becomes a place and temporality of struggle, even in the face of a cosmopolitan geospatial imaginary. The Anthropocene embraces all of humanity only when the global north is also facing an apocalypse.

Therefore, instead of a cosmopolitics of co-existence, what about a performative multi-existence – and not just between place and humans, the human and non-human – that constitutes a radical expression of our entangled togetherness? These entanglements are exactly what Haraway would have us embrace to the point of composting – making odd kin with a tentacular ethnics of the present that does not look to Edenic pasts or apocalyptic futures – “in unexpected collaborations and combinations, hot compost piles” (*Staying* 4). Performative entanglements are always localized – they can be written, oral, place-specific, poetic, narrative, and scholarly – and it shifts in its productions as it produces. This is not meant to transcend localized or placed-based
knowledges but to recognize the complexities from which these knowledges come and the ways in which they manifest themselves.

Co-existence implies a potentially (ideal) beneficial relationship between the human and non-human, but it is not only humans who have had drastic effects on environments. Environments also make changes to humans, which include health concerns such as diseases, pathogens, bacteria, and other elements that are detrimental to humans – all of these things indicate the messy entanglements between humans and their environments (Shaw 519). Caluya also looks at invasive diseases being treated with the same exclusionary state politics as terrorism, which implies, once again, how geopolitics and the geospatial imaginaries of the nation-state intersect to justify state control over the perceived external threat, suggesting that “‘invasion' rhetoric naturalizes the security logics of managing non-Western populations with reference to disease control” (36). But perhaps here I can use the container-based metaphor of the nation-state to reach an alternative understanding of the opposing binary of the human and non-human: as both changing air and bacteria enters our bodies, are they really separate from us? Even as scholars engage with notions of the human and non-human in all of their messiness, it seems there is still a desire to distinguish these things. Perhaps considering the relationship more rhizomatically would help as well. We have never been individuals, but always sympoiesis, or “making-with” one element or another (Haraway, Trouble 67; 58). “Sympoiesis” is also meant to convey “complex, dynamic, responsive, situated, historical systems. It is a word for wording-with, in company” (Haraway, Trouble 58). The human body is always renegotiated and remembered in these instances. Work is done to carve it back out of its rhizomatic and performative existences. And perhaps, then, reconceptualizing the Anthropocene is really a decolonization of the self in space.
Endnotes

1 The overview of planetary responses is inspired from discussions by Donna Haraway, Vandana Shiva, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari.

2 Tweets were also located at, http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com


4 Roberts and Parks also reference their work here: Roberts, J. T. & Parks, B. C. (2007) A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North–South Politics, and Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Their call here for a "hybrid" solution acknowledges the various other agreements and positions that have been enacted or proposed for dealing with the inequalities of climate change, including "grandfathering" (the 1997, Kyoto Protocol is an example of this), carbon intensity (with an emphasis on economic grown with low carbon emissions); a global per capita norm (where those countries whose consumption of fossil fuels was well below the average would be allowed room/ time to develop and emit), and proposals for historic responsibility (which obviously effect many in the global north, specifically Britain and the United States) (199).
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Decolonizing the Cosmopolitan Geospatial Imaginary of the Anthropocene


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